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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
HUGER SINKLER*
Jurisdiction of Courts in Controversies Ecclesiastic
The case of Bramlett v. Young' might well be one of un-
usual significance for presumably the schism which divides
the country over the question of segregation might well ex-
tend itself into the churches. Actually, it seems that the con-
troversy here arose at least in part because of the fears of
the majority of the congregation of the McCarter Presby-
terian Church that the Presbyterian Church in the United
States (Southern) might merge with the Northern branch
of that denomination.
From the facts it appears clear that the McCarter Presby-
terian Church was a member of the Presbyterian Church in
the United States and of the Enoree Presbytery of that
Church, and thus subject to the government and control of
the Enoree Presbytery and the Synod of South Carolina.
Being without a regular pastor, the congregation of the
McCarter Church had employed, on a temporary basis, a
minister who was an instructor at Bob Jones University.
This temporary arrangement had been approved by the En-
oree Presbytery but finally, after a considerable period of
time had elapsed, the Presbytery notified the McCarter
Church that the arrangement should be discontinued. As a
result of this action, and by vote of 38 to 2 (out of a total
membership of 67) the McCarter Church proposed to with-
draw from Enoree Presbytery and set itself up as McCarter
Independent Presbyterian Church.
The action here was commenced by a loyal minority of
11 members who sought to be declared the real McCarter
Presbyterian Church and to be entitled to the possession and
control of the church property.
The Court upheld the claim, noting that the question was
basically one of ecclesiastic jurisdiction and not one for the
*B.A., College of Charleston; Legal Education, University of South
Carolina, School of Law; member City Council of Charleston, 1939-43;
member State Legislature, 1932-36 and 1945-46; member of Charleston
County, South Carolina, and American Bar Associations. Member of
firm of Sinkler, Gibbs & Simons, Charleston, South Carolina.
1. 229 S. C. 519, 93 S. E. 2d 873 (1956).
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civil courts to assert jurisdiction over. It had as a valid
precedent the almost identical situation which had arisen
over a hundred years ago on Johns Island in Charleston
County, where the majority of a congregation of a Presby-
terian church sought to secede from the Charleston Union
Presbytery and to take over for themselves the church prop-
erty in order that they might conduct a so-called Independent
Presbyterian Church.
In addition to the Johns Island case the Court referred
to much authority elsewhere supporting its views.
As a lawyer, one cannot but agree with this holding of
the Court. None the less, it is interesting to speculate upon
the consequences that may result from the decision.
Governor's Power to Suspend Public Officials
The case of Thompson v. Seigler2 involves the Governor's
right to suspend a public officer. In pursuance of a 1956
enactment which provided that any State or County officer
indicted in any court for any crime might, in the discretion
of the Governor, be suspended by the Governor, Governor
George Bell Timmerman, Jr. issued an executive order sus-
pending Sheriff Thompson of Colleton County from office
following his indictment by the Grand Jury of the U. S. Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina. Con-
formable to the 1956 statute, the Governor appointed Seigler
in the stead of Thompson, to act for Thompson until he might
be acquitted.
Thompson first sought a restraining order against Seigler.
Seigler, for his part, sought the issuance of a Rule to Show
Cause requiring Thompson to deliver the office to him. The
Supreme Court passed an Order assuming original jurisdic-
tion in the case and promptly in the public interest disposed
of the questions which had thus arisen.
Thompson contended that since the office of Sheriff was
created by the State Constitution the Governor had no power
to suspend him from office unless there was a method of
removal or suspension provided in the Constitution itself.
The Court did not accept this contention and held that the
language of Section 23 of Article III permitted a mode of
removal or suspension by legislative enactment. This Consti-
tutional provision reads as follows: "Officers shall be re-
2. 230 S. C. 115, 94 S. E. 2d 231 (1956).
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moved for incapacity, misconduct or neglect of duty, in such
manner as may be provided by law when no mode of trial or
removal is provided in this Constitution." It must be noted
that the quoted language from the Constitution employs the
word "removed" and omits reference to "suspension." The
Court held, however, that the right to suspend preliminary
to removal was a step incident to removal and was implied
in the power to remove.
The Court made short shrift of Thompson's contention that
the Act deprived him of his office without process of law,
noting that the right to hold public office is not a vested
property right which is protected by the State and Consti-
tutional provisions prohibiting the taking of property with-
out due process of law.
Justice Oxner noted a dissent in this case based upon the
ground that the delegation to the Governor of the power
to suspend in his discretion was too broad and sweeping to
be sustained. While perhaps an argument, entirely legalistic
in nature, might be advanced to sustain the dissenting view,
the salutary effect of the decision of the majority is to be
applauded. The Constitutional nature of the office of Gov-
ernor of necessity implies that the executive must have broad
discretion in the administration of the laws. The situation
here seems properly distinguishable from one where the legis-
lative enactment delegates powers to administer an Act with-
out defining specific standards for the guidance of an ad-
ministrative board or commission to whom the enforcement
of the law is delegated.
State's Power to Regulate the Practice of Medicine
The case of Dantzler v. Callison3 involves the validity of
an Act of the General Assembly seeking to outlaw the prac-
tice of Naturopathy.
The suit was instituted by members of that profession,
who alleged that they were and had been regularly licensed
Naturopathic practitioners for many years, and that their
practice was their means of livelihood for themselves and
their families. They alleged that they had invested much time
and great sums of money in perfecting themselves for the
practice of their profession, and contended that the provisions
of the Act which curtailed their practice deprived them of
3. 230 S. C. 75, 94 S. E. 2d 177 (1957).
[Vol. 10
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basic rights under the due process clauses of the State and
Federal Constitutions.
The statute, obviously designed to protect the ignorant and
unwary from persons not regarded as competent to practice
preventive and curative medicine, approached the problem
in somewhat oblique fashion. It first prohibited persons pre-
viously licensed to practice Naturopathy from continuing to
practice, but provided that one authorized to practice Naturo-
pathy who had certain qualifications might, upon successfully
passing the examination therein provided for, become licensed
to practice medicine.
Presumably the litigants would have difficulty in qualify-
ing under the new standards and for that reason probably
in all good conscience declared that the effect of the statute
would be to put them out of business.
The basic question before the Court was the power of the
State to regulate the practice of medicine, notwithstanding
that in so doing it might deprive certain individuals then en-
gaged in the practice of medicine from continuing to practice.
The Court concluded that the problem was one peculiarly for
the Legislature and held that in the exercise of its powers it
might impose the additional qualifications set forth in the
Act. It observed that the Act here dealt not with the pro-
fession of medicine but with those who should be permitted
to practice medicine, and cited authority from many states
sustaining as a valid exercise of police power the imposition
of additional requirements upon those engaged in the practice
of any profession.
There can be no quarrel with the result here. Obviously
one has no absolute right to practice any profession. In all
instances it is a right granted upon condition that the prac-
titioner meet qualifications then or thereafter imposed.
In this case the Court aptly observed that the area in
the field of Naturopathic practice had increased much more
rapidly than the required educational qualifications of those
who proposed to practice.
Notwithstanding the decision, the writer is of the view
that the "root doctors" of certain of our Sea Islands along the
coast will long continue to have an abundant calling.
1957]
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Power of Grand Jury to Incur Indebtedness
To understand the result arrived at by the Court in the
case of Gregory v. Rollins4 one has to reach back into the
Reconstruction era. In this case, and upon the basis of earlier
decisions, the Court in effect denied the power of a Grand
Jury of Lancaster County to conduct an audit of the public
records of that County. At the instance of the Lancaster
County Grand Jury, evidenced by a unanimous vote of that
body, there was presented to the Judge of the Sixth Judicial
Circuit a petition seeking an Order empowering the Grand
Jury to audit the fiscal affairs of Lancaster County. The ac-
tion taken was in accordance with the provision of the Code
(Section 38-409) which declares that Grand Juries may, when-
ever in their judgment it becomes necessary, employ one or
more expert accountants to aid them to examine and investi-
gate the offices, books, papers, vouchers and accounts of any
public officer of that County, and to fix the amount of com-
pensation therefor upon the approval of the court given before
such accountant is employed.
An ex parte Order of the court was issued approving an
expenditure of $4,000 for such purpose. Thereupon the audit
was made and a bill for some $3,570 presented for the services
of the auditing firm. The bill was duly approved by ex parte
Order and thereafter a copy of the Order approving the bill
was forwarded to the County Board of Directors. At this
stage the County Board of Directors sought to have the
Order directing them to effect payment to the accountants
vacated. This was denied. Thereafter, this proceeding, being
one in mandamus, was commenced to require the issuance of
warrants to pay the claim.
Issue was raised by the County Board upon the ground that
the County Supply Bill for the then fiscal year allocated all
monies appropriated thereunder and failed to provide for
the payment of this particular claim.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, after the court below
had directed payment of the claim, it was held that since ap-
propriation of public funds is a legislative function it was
beyond the power of the Grand Jury to bind the County, not-
withstanding the positive language of the statute which auth-
orized the Grand Jury to employ accountants.
4. 230 S. C. 269, 95 S. E. 2d 487 (1956).
[Vol. 10
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In reaching this conclusion the Court referred to earlier
decisions which do uphold their position.
The result reached is a curious one. A general statute ex-
ists defining the functions of the Grand Jury. Included among
their functions is that of investigating the fiscal conditions
of the County wherein they function. Obviously something
as complicated as an audit cannot be accomplished without
the help of experts. Consequently, if there is no means pro-
vided for the payment of such experts, the provisions of the
statute authorizing the investigations are rendered nugatory.
It seems to the writer that a different result should have
been reached. Of course, it must be recognized that when
the Constitution of 1895 was written the framers of that doc-
ument had before them a record of waste and extravagance
from the Carpetbagger era, brought about in large measure
from corrupt county governments. Furthermore, at the time
of its adoption there were many counties of the State which
had not then shaken free from the misrule of Negro and
Carpetbag government. As a consequence, framers of the
Constitution of 1895 envisaged county control from the state
capitol where by that time a White majority had been as-
sured. Only through that means could the White majority of
the State protect the less fortunate in counties where the
threat of Carpetbag rule continued. It was with this situ-
ation principally in mind that in drafting the present Consti-
tution no provision was made for local government at the
county level. For many years a single Bill was enacted mak-
ing appropriation for all of the counties. It was well after
the turn of the century before the practice of County Supply
Acts sprang up.
What the Court seems to have overlooked in this case is
that the Legislature, acting through the general statute, had
authorized the appropriation when it empowered Grand
Juries to conduct audits. The Legislature, not the Grand
Jury, effected the appropriation.
The Court also attempted to justify its result on the ground
that the Lancaster County Supply Act for the particular fiscal
year made provision for an audit upon the approval of the
Senator and one of the members of the county legislative
delegation from Lancaster County. Does this reference indi-
cate that the Court has forgotten its decision of some 20 years
1957]
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ago in Bramlette v. Stringer5 wherein it declared that a
county delegation might not exercise executive functions?
Clearly, the provisions in the Lancaster County Supply Bill
run counter to the holding in the Bramlette case. More-
over, they would seem invalid as a special law where a gen-
eral law existed.
Submission of Amendments
In the case of Tipton v. Smith0 the Supreme Court held that
a proposed amendment to Section 5 of Article 10, which had
been voted upon favorably by a majority of those voting
upon the question in the general election held in November
of 1954 was not properly adopted for the reason that the
question posed did not fairly state the proposition upon which
the electorate was voting. It appears that in 1954 the Gen-
eral Assembly proposed an amendment to Section 5 of Arti-
cle 10 of the Constitution, which was intended to relieve
Greenville Memorial Auditorium District in Greenville County
from the limitation of the fifteen percent overlapping debt
limitation in Section 5 of Article 10. The proposing resolu-
tion had directed that the question be submitted in spe-
cific form. Through error the question submitted did not
follow the form set forth in the proposing resolution but
merely incorporated as the question, the title of the pro-
posing resolution. The Court stated that the result of this
was obvious misapprehension and uncertainty on the part
of the electorate and, as a consequence, held the election a
nullity. It stated as the law that it was necessary for the
ballot to describe the amendment plainly, fairly, and in such
words that the average voter might understand its character
and purpose. It noted that this might be done by printing
the title of the proposing resolution if the title fairly set
forth the purpose of the amendment. In this particular case
it found that the title did not fairly apprise the voters of the
intent of the amendment and that as a consequence it was
manifestly erroneous and misleading.
This case points up the necessity of the lawyer who seeks
to determine whether a provision of the Constitution has been
amended to examine not only the text of the amendment in
the Code or in the statutes but the necessity for him to ex-
5. 186 S. C. 134, 195 S. E. 257 (1937).
6. 229 S. C. 471, 93 S. E. 2d 640 (1956).
[Vol. 10
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amine the proceedings of the two Houses as well as the pro-
ceeding in the election at which the amendment itself was
proposed. In this connection, the writer wishes to direct at-
tention to the fact that his own study of state constitutional
amendments has brought forth the conclusion that there are
more than one amendment to the Constitution set forth in
the Code which have not been properly adopted, and, there-
fore, would probably be rejected as valid amendments to the
original text of the Constitution. Extreme caution is required
in any study of a constitutional amendment, and there is no
presumption in favor of the validity of the text which appears
in the bound volume of the Code.
Short Statute of Limitations
In the case of Morgan v. Feagin7 the Court's opinion up-
holds as valid a thirty-day statute of limitations relating to a
contest involving a bond election in the School District of
Berkeley County. In accordance with the provisions of an
Act of the General Assembly, an election was held in the
School District of Berkeley County to determine if bonds of
that school district might be issued. The statute provided
for publication in a newspaper published in Berkeley County,
and also required publication in a newspaper published in
the City of Charleston with circulation in Berkeley County.
The notice was properly published in the Berkeley County
paper but the provisions of the statute relating to publication
in the Charleston paper were not complied with. The election
resulted favorably, and acting in pursuance of the statute,
the result was declared by resolution and a copy of the resolu-
tion filed in the office of the Clerk of Court. More than
thirty days following the action by the Board in filing the
results of the election in the office of the Clerk of Court for
Berkeley County, the action here was instituted. In the ac-
tion it was contended that the election was void because of
the failure to observe the provisions of the statute relating
to publication. The Court did not pass upon this question
but simply held that since the action had been begun beyond
the thirty day limitation provided in the Act, it could not be
successfully maintained. Thus the Court upheld the validity
of this short statute of limitations. The Court stated that the
practical necessity of a statute of this sort was obvious. It
7. 230 S. C. 315, 95 S. E. 2d 621 (1956).
19571
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observed that purchasers of bonds could hardly be found if
the bonds were subject in their hands to attack for alleged
illegality in the proceedings upon their issuance. It further
noted that it was common knowledge that the sale of bonds
is frequently time to take advantage of the market and that
this might be hindered by long delays. The Court held that
the Legislature was the primary judge as to whether the
time allowed by a statute of limitations is reasonable, and
that although the determination in the legislature was re-
viewable by the Courts, that the Courts would not inquire into
the wisdom of the legislative decision in establishing the
period of the legal bar unless the time allowed is manifestly
so insufficient that the statute becomes a denial of justice.
The action of the Supreme Court in this case seems entirely
justified and its decision is both practical and sound. While it
is the first decision of this Court on this specific point, it
was to some extent predictable following the opinion of the
Court in the case of Hite v. Town of West Columbia8 which
upheld a sixty-day statute of limitations involving a question
of annexation of territory by a municipality. The decision is
in accord with decisions of Courts of Last Resort elsewhere.
Limitation of Actions Arising From a Constitutional
"Taking'"
The provision of the South Carolina Constitution providing
that private property may not be taken for public use with-
out just compensation being first made therefor has re-
ceived from our Court an extremely liberal interpretation.
In its opinion in the case of Webb v. Greenwood County9 the
Court characterizes that interpretation as being "broad."
Under the decisions of our Court there is no distinction be-
tween "taking" and "damaging" property. These decisions
hold that the deprivation of the ordinary beneficial use and
enjoyment of one's property is equivalent to the taking of
it, and is as much a "taking" as though the property were
actually appropriated.
In this case the Plaintiff sought damages from such a
Constitutional taking by reason of the construction and op-
eration of the so-called Buzzard's Roost Hydro-electric project
operated by Greenwood County. The project was constructed
8. 220 S. C. 59, 66 S. E. 2d 427 (1951).
9. 229 S. C. 267, 92 S. E. 2d 688 (1956).
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during the 1930's and was in operation in 1940 when he first
complained of injuries to his pasture land by reason of the
irregular flow of water resulting from its operation of the
project, which periodically flooded his pasture lands.
In answer to a plea of the six-year statute, the Plaintiff
asserted that since the taking of private property for public
use without compensation was prohibited by Section 17 of
Article I, no statute of limitations could be imposed by the
Legislature which would cut into the constitutional right to
compensation.
The Court did not agree with this contention, holding that
the statute of limitations affected merely the remedy and
not the right and therefore was operative against a conse-
quential taking such as that involved in this case.
Not passed upon by the Court, was the Defendant's third
contention that since the Saluda River was a navigable stream
of the State of South Carolina the overflow within its banks
is an exercise of the dominant servitude of the State and any
injuries resulting to a lower riparian owner are dacmnumr
absque injuria.
Noting that the question had become academic by reason
of its conformance of the non-suit on the ground that the
six-year statute was applicable, the Court merely remarked
that the rights of the individual and the sovereign power
had been fully discussed in several South Carolina cases, in-
cluding those of Rice Hope Plantation v. South Carolina, Pub-
lic Service Authority 0 and Early v. South Garoliva Public
Service Authority.:"
The obvious lack of harmony between these last two de-
cisions was the subject of critical comment in a review of
the Early case in Vol. 9 of the Law Quarterly published last
year. However, in this particular case it would seem that
there had been an actual invasion of the lands of the Plaintiff,
resulting from the operation of the hydro-electric project
which clearly constituted a taking, within the language of the
Constitutional provision.
10. 216 S. C. 500, 59 S. E. 2d 132 (1950).
11. 228 S. C. 392, 90 S. E. 2d 472 (1955).
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